盛图娱乐注册-为什么苹果没错 Apple is right to worry about the FBIs demand

2022-08-29 00:00

本文摘要:It may come as a surprise to hear that the FBI are trying to force Apple to help them hack an iPhone: one used by one of the killers from December’s mass shooting in San Bernardino, California. Does the FBI not already know everything that


It may come as a surprise to hear that the FBI are trying to force Apple to help them hack an iPhone: one used by one of the killers from December’s mass shooting in San Bernardino, California. Does the FBI not already know everything that people are doing on their phones? In fact, Apple’s devices are among the most secure around — and chief executive Tim Cook’s loud proclamation of his wish to keep them so marks the latest broadside in a battle over just how far the remit of national security reaches.听闻美国联邦调查局(FBI)正试图被迫苹果(Apple)协助他们关卡一部去年12月加州圣贝纳迪诺大规模枪击案一名行凶者用于过的iPhone,你也许不会深感吃惊。FBI怎么会不是早就知悉人们在手机上所做到的一切吗?事实上,苹果的设备是目前最安全性的产品之一,而苹果首席执行官蒂姆錠克(Tim Cook)期望维护iPhone安全性的公开发表宣言,标志着一场关于国家安全性之手应当晃多长的争辩中的近期火力点。For the security services, no technology should be secure beyond penetration in the fight against terrorism. For tech firms, protecting users’ privacy is a cornerstone of both business models and trust. And if you think this is a little rich coming several years after Edward Snowden’s revelations of corporate co-operation with the National Security Agency, Google’s chief executive Sundar Pichai has posted some clarifying messages on Twitter. It would, he argues, be a “troubling precedent” to require companies actively “to enable hacking of customer devices and data” — something quite distinct from giving “law enforcement access to data based on valid legal orders”.对安全部门而言,在缉毒斗争中,任何技术都不该沦为无法密码的障碍。

但对科技公司来说,维护用户隐私既是商业模式的基石,也是夺得用户信任的基石。如果在爱德华斯诺登(Edward Snowden)将企业与美国国家安全局(NSA)之间的合作曝光几年后,你实在这有些让人困惑,那么谷歌(Google)首席执行官桑德尔皮查伊(Sundar Pichai)在Twitter上的发帖则让人明白问题所在。他认为,这将沦为一个“令人不安的先例”——拒绝企业大力“协助密码用户的设备和数据”,这与“让执法人员部门基于有效地法律命令采访数据”可相比之下不是一其实。

The issue has arisen because Apple’s latest mobile operating system prohibits anyone from accessing users’ data without their unique passcode. (The killer, Syed Rizwan Farook, died in a police shootout). If an incorrect passcode is entered too many times, an iPhone can irrecoverably delete all data. Hence the FBI’s request, via a court order served on February 16: that Apple create a specially adapted version of its operating system — dubbed the “FBiOS” by security expert Dan Guido — allowing law enforcement to make an unlimited number of passcode guesses.问题源自苹果近期的移动操作系统禁令任何人在没用户唯一密码的情况下采访他们的数据。行凶者赛义德里兹万法鲁克(Syed Rizwan Farook)在与警员的交火中被射杀。

如果输出不准确密码的次数过多,iPhone将移除所有数据,且不能完全恢复。因此,FBI通过2月16日的一项法院命令拒绝,苹果研发一个专门改篇的操作系统——安全性专家丹圭多(Dan Guido)称作“FBiOS”——让执法人员部门可以无限次地猜测密码。

Opinion has divided along predictable lines. Tech firms, digital rights activists and a good number of iPhone users tend to support the privacy principle. State officials and the more conservatively minded back law enforcement. What is not in dispute is that the precedent at stake is one law enforcement have been seeking to set for some time, and that its outcome will have profound consequences for security, encryption and privacy.舆论方面针对此事的分歧也在预料之中。科技公司、数字维权人士及很多iPhone用户偏向于反对隐私维护原则。


So far as specifics are concerned, even the most ardent libertarian will have little sympathy for the privacy of a dead killer. What counts, however, is not the morality of one case, but whether this constitutes the thin end of a perilous wedge. Here, the proponents of privacy have a powerful case to make.就事论事,即便最疯狂的权利论者也会对一名被射杀的行凶者的隐私抱以丝毫同情。然而,最重要的不是某一案例中的道德准则,而在于这一先例否不会导致一种愈演愈烈的风险。在这一点上,隐私权的支持者有强劲的理由。


Slippery-slope arguments stand or fall on the strength of their evidence for movement from the particular to the general. How convincing is it to suggest that security services may deploy new powers promiscuously once obtained? In the case of technology, the answer seems to be “very”. The past five years show something little short of mania on the part of the NSA and others for hoovering up data and undermining every encryption going. This is hardly surprising. It is what they do.极具争议的观点否站得住脚,各不相同从特例到一般的过程中反对它的证据有多强。关于安全部门一旦取得新的权力就有可能给定行使的论点有多大说服力呢?就技术而言,答案或许是“十分有说服力”。过去5年,我们看见了美国国家安全局及其他机构在收集数据、毁坏加密方面近乎可怕的一面。

这不足为奇。这就是他们的工作。Yet technology presents special hazards under such an approach. Escalation is the rule rather than the exception when it comes to tech — as are unintended consequences. The most damaging cyber attacks are invisible until they have already begun; the most alarming data losses often go undetected, and may remain so for years. It is an unforgiving arena in which to juggle protection and deception. But it is also one in which the very nature of the terrain makes a certain shared level of security integral to the health of the whole.然而,在这种作法下,技术意味著类似的危险性。对科技而言,大大升级是必定,而非值得注意——意想不到的后果某种程度如此。

最不具破坏性的网络攻击在实行之前一般来说无影无踪;最令人担忧的数据泄漏经常会被察觉到,并且有可能持续数年不被察觉到。这是一个残忍的领域,很难在隐私维护和愚弄之间做到均衡,同时,这一领域的本质要求了某种分享安全级别,而后者不可避免地影响整体安全性。Undermining encryption and opening back doors does not just give good guys tools for detecting bad guys. It also creates official data repositories and tools that are themselves vulnerable to assault. It exposes everyone to risks of infection and compromise, and debases vital currencies of trust and co-operation, together with the industries they support.毁坏数据加密、关上后门某种程度不会为好人获取找到坏人的工具,还不会创立自身易遭攻击的官方数据库和工具。这样做到不会使每个人面对遭到病毒感染并作出妥协的风险,同时减少最重要的信任与合作,以及这种信任与合作所承托的行业。

Once developed, a technique can be used again and again. This is why staying safe in a digital age is a moving target, and absolute privacy a fantasy. Yet in these fraught circumstances, Mr Cook is right. Our future safety is best served by the best security for all.一项技术一旦被研发出来,就可以重复用于。这就是为什么在数字时代确保安全性是一个大大变动的目标,而意味著隐私权只是一种幻想。然而,在这些令人担忧的情况下,库克是对的。